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FACIALLY NEUTRAL CRITERIA
AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII:
"BUILT-IN HEADWINDS"
OR PERMISSIBLE PRACTICES?
Although the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,1
amending Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII),2
enlarged the scope of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,3 and although the
new Act strengthened the enforcement powers of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),4 very few changes
were made in any of the Title VII provisions defining unlawful
discriminatory practicesO
However, it is important to note that Congress expressly in-
corporated in the new Act the interpretations given to Title VII
by the courts of all provisions not affected by the Act.6 The
various court interpretations, although numerous, are not exhaus-
tive and many interpretative problems still cloud the operation of
Title VII. One such problem is the question of how Title VII
affects those practices which are neutral in form, but which, when
placed into operation, have discriminatory effects.
This article discusses how Title VII affects the operation of
these facially neutral practices and attempts to determine when
such practices are unlawful under Title VII. It also discusses the
possible effects of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 on this problem.
1 Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 [hereinafter the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972].2 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15
(1970).
3 For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2(2), amends the
definition of "employer" found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970) so that an "employer" now
means "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees..." instead of twenty-five employees as was required before the amendment.
4 The EEOC, in cases where the respondent is not a government, a governmental
agency, or a political subdivision, may file a civil action against the respondent in an
appropriate federal district court if it has been unable to eliminate an unlawful dis-
criminatory practice by the usual informal methods of conference, conciliation, and per-
suasion. See § 4(a) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, supra note 1,
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a), (f)(1) (1970).
5 Section 8 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, supra note 1, amending
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2,-3 (1970).
6 As pointed out in the Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746 (The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972), 118 CONG. REC. H 1861 (daily ed. March 8, 1972) as
adopted by the House of Representatives:
In any area where the new law does not address itself, or in any areas
where a specific contrary intention is not indicated, it was assumed that the
present case law as developed by the courts would continue to govern the
applicability and construction of Title VI I.
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Because Title VII has such a large scope, the discussion here is
limited to the statute's treatment of racial discrimination. Since
the Title was enacted primarily to deal with the problem of racial
discrimination against Blacks7 and since Blacks comprise the larg-
est group of victims of racial discrimination, this article focuses
primarily on discrimination against Blacks even though Title VII
prohibits discrimination against any racial group.8 Most of the
discussion, however, does pertain to any racial discrimination.
I. INTENT IN TITLE VII RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CASES
Under Subsection 706(g), the only discriminatory practices
which may be remedied by the courts are those which were
"intentionally engaged in. 9 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 10 there were two lines of in-
terpretation of the phrase "intentionally engaged in." Some courts
investigated the employer's subjective intentions and motivations
and held that the employer's practices could result in unlawful
discrimination only if a subjective purpose to discriminate were
found. Other courts looked only to the practice itself and held it to
discriminate unlawfully on the sole basis that resulting con-
sequences discriminated against racial minorities.
The Griggs decisions in the district court'1 and the court of
appeals12 and the district court decision in Parham v. South-
western Bell Telephone Company' 3 illustrate the first position.
The lower courts in Griggs reviewed respondent Duke Power
Company's actions and found that diploma and test requirements
had been adopted by the company without any purpose or in-
tention to discriminate against Blacks. Both courts further found
that the requirements were applied evenhandedly to both Blacks
and Whites and that the company had acted in good faith and
without any purpose to discriminate. They concluded that al-
7 Case Note, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 188, 189 (1971); Recent Developments, 17 VILL. L.
REV. 147, 148-49 (1971); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
235, 237 (1971); Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title Vii of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1111-14 (1971).
8 Under §§ 8(a), (c) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, supra note 1,
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, -3 (1970), it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate
on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." No words limiting the terms
"color," "race," or "national origin" to Blacks can be found in any part of Title VII.
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), as amended, § 4(a) of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, supra note I. It should be emphasized that the language "intentionally
engaged in" was not changed by the new Act.
10 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
12 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
13 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 6742 (E.D. Ark. 1969), rev'd, 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
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though the results of performance of Blacks and Whites were
disparate, this did not show that the use of these requirements
was an "intentionally engaged in ... unlawful employment prac-
tice" prohibited by Title VII. This conclusion rested on the dual
grounds that although the tests were not specifically job related,
they did serve a business purpose, i.e., making sure all employees
had attained a certain level of educational competence, and that
the company had not established the requirements for purposes of
discrimination. 14
This position was also advanced by the district court in Par-
ham:
In their thorough brief counsel for plaintiff earnestly contend
that irrespective of the subjective good faith and efforts of the
defendant to refrain from discrimination the hiring policies
and practices which defendant has followed and which it is
now following are inherently discriminatory in that they in-
evitably tend to discourage or disqualify Negro applicants for
employment. It is urged that defendant's requirement that all
of its employees must have completed a high school educa-
tion is irrelevant to-the needs of defendant's business and
bears more heavily upon Negroes than upon whites, and the
same complaint is made about the defendant's policy against
hiring "unwed mothers."
That argument may be interesting sociologically, but this
Court is not willing to read into the Act any requirement that
an employer tailor his hiring requirements to meet the needs
of deprived minorities. If he adopts his criteria in good faith
and for what reasonably appear to him to be valid reasons,
and if the criteria are not themselves based on race, the Court
does not think that they are prohibited by the Act merely
because many Negroes on account of cultural and economic
deprivations may not be able to meet them.15
On the other hand, the courts adopting the objective approach
were concerned primarily with the effects or consequences of an
employer's policy rather than the motivation or design behind it.
The "intentionally engaged in" clause of Subsection 706(g) was
read to require only that the employer meant to do what he did. In
'4292 F. Supp. at 250-51 (M.D.N.C. 1968), and 420 F.2d at 1233-36 (4th Cir. 1970).
The court of appeals considered the fact that the company was willing to pay for the
education of incumbent Blacks so that they could meet the requirements and be eligible for
advancement as strong evidence of the company's lack of purpose to discriminate. Id. at
1233 n.6.
1' 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 6742, 6748-49 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
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other words, it was not necessary to prove that the employer
intended to discriminate. All that was required was proof that the
employer intentionally effectuated the policy or rule which had
discriminatory effects. 16 This "effect oriented" approach to Sub-
section 706(g) of Title VII was explained by the court in Local
189, Papermakers v. United States:17
Section 706(g) limits injunctive ... relief to cases in which
the employer or union has "intentionally engaged in" an
unlawful employment practice. Again, the statute, read liter-
ally, requires only that the defendant meant to do what he
did, that is, his employment practice was not accidental.',
In attempting to weigh the two positions, consideration of the
stated purpose of Title VII gives support to this latter view. The
Act is not a criminal statute which requires mens rea but is
"regulatory social legislation designed to change conduct and
eradicate discriminatory social practices."' 9 In order to achieve
this goal, which in itself is objective in nature, the preferable test
would clearly appear to be one which focuses upon the actual
effect of the action, not the subjective motivation or purpose
underlying it. The Title VII phrase "intentionally engaged in" has
been analogized to the term "intention to discriminate" under
Subsection 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.20 Since
"the Supreme Court has held that the intention under that
regulatory social legislation is satisfied if the consequences were
foreseeable,"'2 ' it has been argued that the operation of Title VII
"does not turn on the subjective feelings of employers, unions,
and other respondents. '" 22
Indeed if the operation of Title VII were to hinge upon a
determination of a respondent's subjective intent, the remedial
effect of this legislation would be greatly diluted. The subjective
standard is at best illusory and almost impossible to prove, and in
18 In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970), the
district court held:
[G]ood faith in the origination or application of the policy is not a defense.
An intent to discriminate is not required to be shown so long as the dis-
crimination shown is not accidental or inadvertent.
17 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), aff'g 282 F. Supp.
39 (E.D. La. 1968).
See also Case Comment, 6 GEORGIA L. REV. 194, 198 (197 1); Recent Developments,
supra note 7, at 147, 157; Note, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 141, 145 (1970); and Case Comment,
47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 381 (197 1).
18 416 F.2d 980, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1969) (emphasis in original).
19 Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22
RUTGERS L. REV. 465, 471 (1968).
20 Id. at 475 n.2 1.
21 Id. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 36 (1967).
22 Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 475.
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all probability nothing short of an admission would adequately
satisfy the test. Furthermore, Title VII is not meant to punish the
"wrong thinking" or consciously racially prejudiced respondent;
its goal is to afford employment opportunity not limited or dimin-
ished as a result of racial group membership. Obviously it would
be counterproductive if the remedial force of the law were
empowered to step in only where the respondent subjectively
intended to deny employment opportunity on racial grounds. The
legislation is able to serve its function and purpose only when it
makes available a remedy to cure discrimination which actually
exists, not merely discrimination which was purposefully intended
to exist.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission discussed
this interpretation of Title VII in one of its decisions:
Respondent, like so many employers, tends to view allega-
tions of discrimination as if they were comparable to criminal
allegations. In this view, the charge connotes hostility, mis-
trust, or devaluation of an individual, a firm, or an institution.
Thus, the conclusion is easily reached that the one charged
with an act of discrimination possesses an evil state of mind.
It then becomes difficult for the one charged to focus atten-
tion objectively on the description of the discriminatory act.
It should be axiomatic that Title VII enforcement clearly
does not have such import. Its underlying purpose is to define
those employment situations that tend to judge, limit, segre-
gate, or classify employees on criteria which prove to have a
demonstrable racial effect without a reasonably necessary
business motive. When viewed against this backdrop, it be-
comes clear that Congress, through the Commission, sought
to provide a remedy to adjust the needless employment hard-
ships facing minority workers whether they are occasioned by
purposeful discrimination or result from the arbitrary oper-
ation of a personnel system. 23
It appears that the Griggs decision in the Supreme Court24
resolves the interpretative difficulties surrounding the term "in-
tentionally engaged in." In adopting the objective view, Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous court, stated:
[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as "built-in headwinds" for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability.
23 EEOC Case No. 6-8-7426.
24 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (197 1).
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The company's lack of discriminatory intent is suggested
by special efforts to help the undereducated employees
through Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition
for high school training. But Congress directed the thrust of
the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not
simply the motivation.25
As a result of the Griggs decision, the gravamen of a Title VII
violation is not the motivation or good faith of the employer in
devising or applying a rule or practice, but the intentional use of a
rule which has the prohibited effect of promoting racial dis-
crimination. In this light, the mere fact that an employer con-
sciously devised a certain policy should be enough, in and of
itself, to satisfy the "intentionally engaged in" requirement of
Subsection 706(g) if it could be demonstrated that the policy has
the prohibited effect. This means that the key focal point of a Title
VII discrimination action is the content of the challenged rule.
This in turn implies that policies which discriminate on their face
are clearly prohibited under Title VII because of the strong lan-
guage in Subsection 703(a) to the effect that race per se cannot be
a valid criterion for an employment decision. 26 However, when
we move away from these obvious cases toward those involving
apparently neutral policies, a new and more complex set of rules
must be followed to determine the presence or absence of a Title
VII violation.
I1. How NEUTRAL RULES BECOME DISCRIMINATORY
The investigation of racially neutral rules is an outgrowth of the
purposes and goals of Title VII. The laws prohibiting racial dis-
25 Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), as amended, § 8 of the Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Act of 1972, supra note 1, reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge anv individual or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Apparently the underlying assumption is that race by itself is irrelevant to job perform-
ance and therefore is not a permissible basis for employment classification. This idea
is further substantiated by the fact that classifications drawn along racial lines are not
included in the bona fide occupation qualification exception contained in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e) (1970), even though this exception is extended to classifications based on
religion, sex, or national origin.
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crimination in employment are linked to the goal of securing a
position of "equality" for Blacks. 2 7 The problem is to define
"equality." It has been noted that there are two senses to "equal-
ity": equal treatment and equal achievement. 2 The notion behind
equal treatment is that race should be ignored in any employment
decision, while the notion behind equal achievement is that the
actual distribution of jobs, both in quantity and quality, should be
proportionate.?"
Theoretically, equal treatment should lead to equal achieve-
ment.30 That is, if Blacks and Whites are placed on an equal
footing at the start of the employment race, and if all participants
in the race are treated equally, the end result should be equal
achievement. However, the many years of racial prejudice have
left a disproportionally large number of Blacks impoverished, 31
unemployed,3 2 and undereducated. 33 As a result,
even if color is not given any weight in employment deci-
sions, and in that sense equal treatment [is] obtained, substan-
tial inequalities by race in the distribution of jobs will persist
in the immediate and foreseeable future.3 4
It was this disparity in economic and societal position that was
one of the prime motivating factors culminating in the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,a5 On this basis, the legislative
history of the 1964 Act arguably indicates that Title VII follows
an equal achievement approach. However, some have maintained
that a color blindness requirement is embedded in Title VII.36
27 See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
28 Fiss, supra note 7, at 237- 38.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 238.
31 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 197"1 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 324, Table No. 518
(197 1). The figures indicate that 32.3 percent of all Blacks are considered to be in poverty
(using the Government's poverty standards) while only 9.5 percent of all Whites are
considered to be in poverty.
32 Id. at 210, Table No. 327. The figures indicate that as of May, 1971 the unemploy-
ment rate for non-White males was 8.1 percent while only 5.1 percent for Whites. These
figures indicate that 10.8 percent of all non-White female potential employees were
unemployed as compared to 6.5 percent for their White counterparts.
33 Id. at 108-09, Table No. 162, 164. Evidence indicates that the median number of
years of schooling completed by Blacks as of 1970 was 9.9 years while this same median
was 12.2 for Whites. As of 1970, the proportion of Blacks 25 years and older who had
completed high school was only 33.7 percent (only 4.5 percent had completed college) as
compared to a figure of 55.2 percent (11.0 percent had completed college) for the members
of any race but Black. Note that these figures highlight the educational plight of Blacks
without even discussing the quality of the education received.
34 Fiss, supra note 7, at 238.
35 See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
36 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 7, at 237.
Theoretically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970), as amended, §4 of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, supra note I, prevents discrimination against Whites on the
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Thus, it would follow that the goal of Title VII is to enhance the
economic and societal position of Blacks without radically
affecting the economic and societal position of Whites.37
In spite of such arguments, the courts recently have exhibited
more concern with the results of rules created by employers than
with the neutrality of treatment afforded by the use of these
rules.38 In fact, the courts have clearly indicated that neutral rules
which preserve the effects of past discrimination are subject to
attack under Title VII. 39 Furthermore, some courts have in-
dicated that neutral rules which preserve the present status im-
posed on Blacks because of racial prejudice in general may also
violate Title VII.4 0
It must be emphasized, however, that the language and struc-
ture of Title VII cannot be ignored, even in light of achieving the
goals of Title VII. It can be argued, therefore, that if a rule does
not on its face judge an individual on the basis of his race, then it
does not fall within the purview of Title VII. In response to this
argument it has been suggested that a rule neutral on its face but
discriminatory in effect should be viewed as the "functional equiv-
alent" of a rule judging an employee on the basis of his race.41 A
two-step process in establishing functional equivalence has been
proposed. The first step is to show that use of the rule, like the
use of race, will result in an unfavorably differential impact on
Blacks; the second step is to show that the rule, like race, judges
the individual in a manner not considered to be an accurate
prediction of the individual's productivity.4 2
basis of race as well as discrimination against Blacks. This would imply that employers, for
example, cannot hire a Black with less experience than a White just because of the racial
difference between the two.
37 Fiss, supra note 7, at 265.
38 See notes 16- 25 and accompanying text supra.
39 By holding that Title VII is geared toward the remedy of discriminatory con-
sequences of neutral employment practices, the Supreme Court in Griggs put to rest the
arguments made by the district court that the prospectivity aspects of Title VII insulated
"residual" discrimination arising from prior inequitable treatment. 401 U.S. 424, 430-31
(1971). It should be noted that the court of appeals also had reversed the district court as
to this point although it consequently denied relief because of the employer's lack of
discriminatory purpose. 420 F.2d 1225, 1230 (4th Cir. 1970).
The court of appeals in Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 994
(5th Cir. 1969), offered the following explanation of why Title V II has this reach:
When an employer adopts a system that necessarily carries forward the
incidents of discrimination into the present, his practice constitutes ongoing
discrimination, unless the incidents are limited to those that safety and
efficiency require.
See also Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
40 See part IV infra.
41 Fiss, supra note 7, at 296- 304.
42 Id. at 299.
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This approach apparently has been adopted by Griggs. The
Supreme Court, while examining the merits of a test used by the
employer to determine prospective employees' qualifications and
of a requirement that all employees have a high school diploma,
specifically noted that the "Act proscribes not only overt dis-
crimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation." a The Court then engaged in a two-step
analysis to determine if the neutral rule had violated Title VII.
The Court first determined that the employer's test and diploma
requirements effectively discriminated against prospective em-
ployees on the basis of race. 44 It held:
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices. 45
The Court then examined under the rubric of "business neces-
sity" 46 whether or not the two criteria in question were related to
job performance. It found that "neither the high school com-
pletion requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to
bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the
jobs."'47
The Supreme Court has thus indicated that it views the use of
neutral rules which have discriminatory effects as the functional
equivalent of the use of rules which judge an employee on the
basis of race. In order to examine this doctrine more thoroughly,
it is necessary to discuss individually each step of the two-step
plan of analysis.
A. The Determination of Discrimination-
The Use of Statistics
Although Griggs did not answer the question of how much
proof is needed to establish the presence of impermissible racial
discrimination, several other cases do seem to provide an an-
- 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
44 Id. at 428, 430-33.
4 Id. at 430.
46 Id. at 431.
47 Id. The Court pointed to evidence which demonstrated that employees who had not
completed high school or who had not taken the ability tests were performing satisfactorily
in the departments to which the testing and diploma criteria now applied. The Court also
noted the promotion record of present employees who would not meet the new criteria. To
the Court this suggested "the possibility that the requirements may not be needed even for
the limited purpose of preserving the avowed policy of advancement within the Com-
pany." Id. at 432.
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swer.48 In the majority of Title VII cases employing statistics,
statistical evidence of small numbers of Blacks employed by a
company is presented along with statistical evidence as to the
presence of a disproportionally larger number of available Black
workers. When this disparity is great, some case law suggests that
this showing alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
Title VII violation. 49 The burden of proof is then shifted from the
plaintiff to the respondent employer or union.50 In order to sustain
his burden, the respondent must offer evidence either as to busi-
ness necessity which in some way justifies or excuses the dis-
parity or as to the unreliability of the statistics, e.g., there is a lack
of qualified Blacks available. 51
One of the reasons that statistics alone may establish a prima
facie case is that these statistics may be the only objective proof
available to a plaintiff and, absent their use, the plaintiff would be
unable to expose impermissible discrimination which he knows
exists but which is veiled by ostensibly neutral procedures 2
Since employers may justify the challenged practice on the basis
that it has an essential purpose and function in the operation of
their businesses, it is quite reasonable that the employer be called
upon to state and prove this purpose when the effects of it are
challenged. The employer, with his knowledge of the particular
alleged necessity, is in a far better position to prove its existence
than is a plaintiff to prove its nonexistence.
Some cases have found statistics to be even more conclusive.
48 This article does not deal with the problem of whether Title VII applies only to those
actions where the sole reason for the conduct is illegal or whether it also applies to those
actions where the illegal conduct is only a partial factor in the employer's policy. This
question has largely been answered in King v. Laborers Local 818, 433 F.2d 273 (6th Cir.
1971). See also Comments, The Partial Factor Test in Title VII Discrimination, 1972
WASH. U.L.Q. 368.
49 See Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.
1972); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Sheet
Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Cypress v. Newport News
General & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
5
°See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 120 (5th Cir. 1972); and
United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 127 n.7 (8th Cir. 1969).
51 United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972), established that in a
Title VII suit, when lopsided statistics are shown which present a prima facie case, an
inference of discrimination arises from the statistics themselves. As a result, the burden of
coming forward with evidence is not on the Attorney General but on the company. In
other words, the company must show the lack of available qualified Blacks. The Attorney
General does not initially have to show the availability of qualified Black workers. See also
Note, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 143, 155-56 (1971).
52 Fiss, supra note 7, at 297-98. Furthermore, the court in Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971), felt that
"In racial discrimination cases statistics often demonstrate more than the testimony of
many witnesses . I..." d. at 247 (emphasis added).
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The Parham case53 held that the statistics showing that almost no
Blacks were employed by the company and that the few who were
employed held only the most menial positions established a Title
VII violation as a matter of law. 54 A plain reading of this holding
leads to the conclusion that the business necessity doctrine will
neither be recognized nor given weight in cases where statistical
evidence conclusively establishes a discriminatory effect. United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86,55 while not explicitly rejecting the
idea that in a particular factual situation statistics might prove
discrimination as a matter of law, cautions against their improper
use:
Of course, as is the case with all statistics, their use is condi-
tioned by the existence of proper supportive facts and the
absence of variables which would undermine the reason-
ableness of the inference of discrimination which is drawn.56
The effect of Parham may, however, be limited by the peculiar
factual situation which that case presented. Although the Court
found a Title VII violation, no remedy was ordered as the Court
also found that the company had already begun an affirmative
action plan which was deemed sufficient to remedy the situation.57
Absent the existence of this plan, it is unclear whether or not the
court would still have taken its stand based on statistical evidence
alone, or whether it would have found it judicious to base its
finding of discrimination on additional evidence of discriminatory
practices. If it had taken the latter course,.an assertion of business
necessity by the company might have become an appropriate
consideration.
Thus, as a general principle, the courts are probably not yet
willing to throw out the business necessity doctrine when faced
with statistical evidence of discriminatory effects. However, when
the statistics are very persuasive, it is possible that they will
require a higher showing of business necessity to justify the dis-
parities.
B. The Business Necessity Doctrine
Even if a neutral rule has a discriminatory effect on Blacks,
case law seems to indicate that if the rule in question is grounded
53 Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
54 Id. at 426.
55 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971), aff'g 315 F. Supp. 1202
(W.D. Wash. 1970).
56 443 F.2d at 55 1 (footnote omitted).
57 433 F.2d at 429.
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in "business necessity," it will withstand attack under Title VII.58
The business necessity defense is not mentioned in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 but rather has been developed by the courts
for dealing with cases involving employment practices which are
neutral on their face.59 The purpose of this test is to determine
whether the employment rule in question is based on "an over-
riding legitimate, nonracial purpose" or if it is to be treated as one
based primarily on racial concerns (i.e., concerns which have no
relevance to productivity and are predetermined apart from the
control of any individual involved). 60
It is not exactly clear what constitutes "an overriding legiti-
mate, nonracial business purpose" which is "essential to the safe
and efficient operation"61 of a business. In applying Title VII to
facially neutral rules which in fact had discriminatory effects, the
Supreme Court in Griggs noted, "The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited." 62
In striking down the use of certain testing and educational
requirements which the company argued were used to "improve
the overall quality of the work force," 63 the Supreme Court ob-
served that upon the evidence presented, it was apparent that
employees who entered before the requirements were instituted
and did not in fact meet the requirements "continued to perform
satisfactorily and make progress in departments for which the
high school and test criteria are now used."" The Court then
stated that criteria which operate as " 'built-in headwinds' for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability"
were not protected by "good intent or absence of discriminatory
intent."6 5
One federal district court, in Johnson v. Pike Corp. of Amer-
ica,'66 has interpreted Griggs to mean that an employer's use of
neutral rules which may have discriminatory racial effects may
not be justified on the grounds that these rules save the employer
from inconvenience, annoyance, or even expense.6 7 The rule must
58 See note 62 and the accompanying.text infra.
59 See Recent Cases, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484 n.15 (1972).
6o See Local 189, Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1969).
61 416 F.2d at 989-90.
62 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
w Id.
64 Id. at 431- 32 (footnote omitted).
c Id. at 432.
66 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
67 The district court specifically held:
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pertain to the employee's ability to carry out his duties before it
can be justified as a business necessity.6 8 It has been argued that
this interpretation of Griggs is unnecessarily broad and that the
business necessity defense should be considered by a reviewing
court whenever an employment practice is designed to test not
only an employee's job skills but also his overall productivity.6 9
However, even that argument contends that a business necessity
defense should arise only where "substantial cost" to the employ-
er is involved and only where the "discriminatory effects are
minimal." 70
While it is indeed doubtful that most courts will consistently go
as far as the Johnson court,71 it seems certain that a mere showing
of the achievement of some vague business purpose will not
suffice to establish business necessity. In some cases, in the face
of apparent business necessity, it may be relevant to inquire into
the availability of a satisfactory alternative practice which would
achieve the same business end and which would also alleviate
racial discrimination. In Local 189, Papermakers v. United
States,72 the court was confronted with a seniority system which
locked incumbent Black employees into previously imposed ra-
cially divided classifications. The court seemed to indicate that
even though the present seniority system may have satisified
some business purpose, the employer was under a duty to find a
similar proposal which alleviated the discriminatory effects of past
racial classification. 73 It is important to note that the factual
situation in Local 189, Papermakers involved a seniority system
The sole permissible reason for discriminating against actual or prospective
employees involves the individual's capability to perform the job effectively.
This approach leaves no room for arguments regarding inconvenience, an-
noyance or even expense to the employer.
id. at 495.68 Id.
S9 See generally Recent Cases, supra note 59.
70 Id. at 1487.
71 Arguably, the Johnson court itself would not stringently apply the same standard in a
different factual situation. In Johnson the rule in question authorized discharge of employ-
ees whose wages had been garnished several times. The court, in rejecting the company's
arguments that the administrative expense and time consumed in responding to garnish-
ments detracted from efficient running of the business and therefore comprised sufficient
business necessity to justify dismissals, pointed to the differential impact on Blacks which
this requirement had and stated that the company's arguments did not adequately justify
this discrimination. However, if the number of garnishments were to be increased from
"several" to one hundred, it seems probable that even this court would give more weight
to the company's arguments. In essence, it is possible that even the Johnson court might
be presented with a future state of facts that might lead it to retreat from the stringent
position it has taken and to consider the degree aspect by indulging in some form of
balancing.
72 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1969).
73 Id. at 990.
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which the court felt was preserving the effects of prior racial
discrimination. It thus is not clear whether inquiry into alternative
methods must be made only when the situation involves a neutral
rule preserving past discrimination or whenever the situation in-
volves any practice that differentiates between people on the basis
of race.
After the foregoing discussion it should now be helpful to
examine specific examples of facially neutral rules which may
have a discriminatory impact and to examine how the courts have
dealt with them. To date, it appears that such neutral rules
subject to attack under Title VII have fallen into two major
categories: (1) those which preserve the effects of the employer's
past racial discrimination and (2) those which preserve and/or
augment the effects of societal racial discrimination generally.
Each category and the examples thereunder are discussed sepa-
rately.
III. PRESENT EFFECTS OF PAST DISCRIMINATION
A number of courts has recently held that effects of past dis-
crimination may result in present and future discrimination. 74 As a
result, these courts have assumed the duty of striking down pol-
icies which perpetuate discriminatory effects. Examples of such
policies which have come under Title VII attack are (1) ability
tests, (2) seniority systems, and (3) recruitment practices. 75
A. Ability Tests
Among the more frequently challenged -facially neutral criteria
are ability tests. 76 Assuming no unfairness in the administration or
scoring, an ability test would not appear to be a racially dis-
criminatory device which would run afoul of the purpose of Title
VII. Since one of the goals of Title VII is to rid the employment
process of irrelevant criteria based on impermissible racial clas-
sifications, the fairly administered ability test seems to fall easily
within the scope of permitted activities under Title VII. However,
74 See Case Comments, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 381, 388 (197 1). See also notes 27-47
and accompanying text supra.
75 This article will not discuss the possible discriminatory impact of an employer's
decision to move his plant from a city into a predominantly White suburban area. This
topic has been thorougly discussed in an excellent article by Blumrosen, The Duty to Plan
for Fair Employment: Plant Location in White Suburbia, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 383 (1971).
76 The use of ability tests has sharply increased since the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and as a result there has been a corresponding increase in the "employment of
doubtful testing practices which ... have discriminatory effects." Case Note, 40 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 350, 353 (1971).
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closer scrutiny reveals that such a device may be employed to
obtain the same effect as a policy of overt racial discrimination.
Therefore, viewed under the functional equivalence rationale,
ability tests in certain circumstances may be facially neutral rules
imbued with the infirmity of racial discrimination.
The question arising with regard to the use of some standard-
ized ability tests is "whether giving preference to those with
superior ability to score well on tests may constitute unlawful
racial discrimination. " 77 Ability tests have been shown to measure
past learning. 78 It has also been stated that:
[T]ests measure how well a person has assimilated the
knowledge and skills that the particular test is measuring.
... [Cirucial factors in a person's score are the quality and
extent of his past schooling and training and the degree of
correlation between his cultural milieu and that which serves
as the test's point of reference. 79
It has not been denied that Blacks and other racial minorities
generally obtain lower average scores on these standardized tests
than do Whites. 80 Viewed in terms of the functional equivalence
standard, it has been argued that use of tests in which Blacks
consistently score significantly lower than Whites is analogous to
a racially discriminatory employment practice 8' unless the test is
proven to be a valid predictor of job performance 82 and thus
comes within the business necessity doctrine.
Apart from this general evidence, the threshold issue is still
whether or not the use of these tests is blanketly protected by
Subsection 703(h) of Title VII.P Phrased in another manner,
77 Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1637
(1969).
78 Wesman, Intelligent Testing, 23 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 267, 269 (1968).
79 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 77, at 1639.
80 [The] general patterns of racial discrimination, lesser educational and cul-
tural opportunities for black people, and cultural separatism that have
marked our society for generations have impeded blacks in attaining the
background necessary for success in existing standardized tests.
Id. at 1640.
The Supreme Court in Griggsnoted:
The Court of Appeals' opinion, and the partial dissent, agreed that, on the
record in the present case, "whites register far better on the Company's
alternative requirements" than Negroes. This consequence would appear to
be directly traceable to race .... Because they are Negroes, petitioners have
long received inferior education in segregated schools .....
401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (footnotes and citations omitted).
81 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (197 1). See also, Note, supra note 5 1;
Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Implications for Private and Public Employ-
ers, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 901 (1972); and Case Comments, supra note 74.
82 See Developments, supra note 7, at 1123.
83 This subsection is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) and reads in part:
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does this subsection absolutely sanction the use of all "profes-
sionally developed ability tests," or does the proviso, "not design-
ed, intended or used to discriminate because of race," limit the
range of protected tests?
In response to this interpretative difficulty it has been suggested
that a "professionally developed test" for purposes of Subsection
703(h) is "one which has been measured and tailored by the
standards of psychological testers to the needs of the particular
job" s and that this term "must refer to the test as applied, since
the user of the test and not its writer is subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission and the courts."8 5 Viewed in this manner,
Subsection 703(h) does not negate the directive of Subsection
703(a)86 but merely protects tests which, although they have an
adverse impact on Blacks, are actually valid and do in fact test
skills necessary for the particular job.87
Pursuant to its powers under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the
EEOC has issued guidelines regarding the use of tests in employ-
ment.88 If the use of a particular test results in adverse impact on
minority groups, the g.idelines state that its use constitutes dis-
crimination prohibited by Title VII unless the test is properly
validated and the employer demonstrates that no alternative
procedure is available which would have a lesser differential im-
pact.8 9 The guidelines posit several possible methods of validation
which the EEOC deems acceptable.90 The standards proposed for
each method are generally high and would not consider opinions
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, ... nor shall it be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race ....
84 Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 505.
85 Id. at 506.
86 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
87 The legislative history of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act supports this
interpretation. For a detailed analysis of this history see Note, supra note 5 1, at 148-5 2.
In Griggs, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislative history was:
This language in the original Tower amendment indicates that Senator
Tower's aim was simply to make certain that job-related tests would be
permitted. The opposition to theamendment was based on its loose wording
which the proponents of Title VII feared would be susceptible to mis-
interpretation. The final amendment, which was acceptable to all sides, could
hardly have required less of a job relation than the first.
401 U.S. 424, 436 n. 12 (1971).
88 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1972).
S9Id. at § 1607.3.
9
"Id. at §8 1607.4-5. According to these guidelines, an employer using ability tests
must have available for inspection evidence which indicates that the tests do not dis-
criminate unlawfully. Such evidence must include empirical evidence based on studies
"employing generaily accepted procedures for determining criterion related validity ... "
Id. at § 1607.5.
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of the employer or his staff sufficient unless they were supported
by "hard" data. The purpose of the validation is to establish that
the test used actually measures the skills or predicts performance
necessary for the job in question. If this is not established, the
discrimination which results is not protected by the job related-
ness standard of the business necessity doctrine.9 1
The problem now is to examine just how far the courts have
accepted the EEOC guidelines; for although the guidelines impose
a heavy burden upon the employer to justify his testing procedure
once it is under attack, the courts have not always abided by the
guidelines mandate. The court of appeals in Griggs rejected the
argument that tests must be job related in order to be protected by
Subsection 703(h).92 The court recognized that the EEOC guide-
lines required job relatedness but concluded that this standard
was not only not mandated by the Act but was also contradictory
to congressional intent.93 The court further stated that although
other courts have held that the statutory gloss provided by an
agency charged with administration of a statute is "entitled to
great weight," there is no mandate that "an EEOC interpretation
is binding upon the courts." 94
Relying in part on the decision of the court of appeals in
Griggs, the court in Broussard v. Schlumberger Well Services95
held that the testing requirements in issue were not shown to be
discriminatory. This decision is a hybrid in that while it rejected
the argument that the use of any test not professionally validated
as to job relatedness is a discriminatory practice, the court at the
same time observed that the tests used were, in a practical sense,
job related. The plaintiff charging discrimination in the testing
requirement had not been allowed to take the written test which
was a prerequisite to promotion as he had failed the practical
examination which was a prerequisite to the written test.96 The
Furthermore, the guidelines establish certain minimum criteria which these studies must
satisfy before they constitute evidence of validity. For example, the studies demonstrating
the usefulness of the exam must be made on a representative sample "of the normal or
typical candidate group for the ... jobs in question." Id.
Even the conditions under which the exams are given are regulated. The tests "must be
administered and scored under controlled and standardized conditions .... Id.
91 Id. at § 1607.3.
92420 F.2d 1225, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1970).9 3 1d. at 1233, 1235.
94 Id. at 1234. Although the holding of this court rejecting the necessity of job related-
ness is clearly not supportable in light of later case law, the case is illustrative of one line
of judicial opinion regarding deference to the standards of the EEOC guidelines.
95 315 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
9c Id. at 5 12. It should be noted, however, that the exact nature of the "practical test"
involved was not stated in the opinion. The court did, however, mention that "The
supervisor's estimate of [plaintiff's] ability is a product of business judgment, which this
Court will not second guess." Id. It is possible, therefore, that further inspection might
FALL 1972]
Journal of Law Reform
court's finding was that there was no racial motivation in the
refusal to allow plaintiff to take the written test, and therefore the
plaintiff had failed to show that the testing requirement had dis-
criminatory effects.97 Still, this decision apparently stands for the
proposition that if discriminatory effects are proved, then an in-
vestigation of the job relatedness of the test will be necessary.98
Although the case is often cited as being out of phase with the
EEOC guidelines, the only point of division seems to be the type
of validation required. While the guidelines call for technical vali-
dation of job relatedness, the court in Broussard approved prac-
tical validation. 99 In light of what both the EEOC and other
courts have actually accepted as validation of job relatedness, the
two standards apparently are not in conflict.
In United States v. H. K. Porter Co.,100 a case often consid-
ered as endorsing and supporting the guidelines, the court, while
stating that it agreed "in principle" with the guidelines require-
ment of job relatedness, also stated that professional validation,
although desirable, was not absolutely required. 10' In explanation
of this position the court wrote:
If this statute is to be construed as requiring test validation,
the important aspect of the matter ,is not to be able to say that
it has been conducted by a professional psychologist but to be
satisified that it has been conducted fairly and properly. 102
In holding the use of the tests in question to be lawful under Title
VII, the court relied on the word of the company's personnel
director who had what the court termed "requisite quali-
have resulted in a finding of arbitrariness in the supervisor's judgment. This observation is
merely speculative, however, since very little on this point was included in the opinion.
See United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C. 1971),
finding a Title VII violation in the use of preemployment tests where the determination of
a passing score was at the subjective discretion of the employer on an individual basis. The
tests here also had not been shown to be successful predictors of job performance, and the
testing program had been used in the past to discriminate against Blacks.
a The court held specifically:
The Court is not persuaded that the failure to allow Mr. Larry to take the
written examination for First Class Painter was racially motivated. A man
must prove himself on the job before he is allowed to take the written
examination. The supervisor's estimate of Mr. Larry's ability is a product of
business judgment, which this Court will not second-guess.
315 F. Supp. at 512.
9 8 1 d.
99 This attitude is found in the court's statement that the employee must "prove himself
on the job" before being permitted to take the written test and that the tests involved here
"were job related in the very practical way that a typing test is related to the job of
typing."Id.
100 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
101 Id. at 76, 78.
102 Id. at 76.
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fications."' 0 3 The court also observed that although the director
had conducted no "test validation as such," he had "taken steps
which comprise the basic elements of validation. " 10 4
In Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Author-
ity,10 5 a case involving use of tests by the state transit authority,
the analysis, although based on the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments and on two federal statutes, 0 6 is useful in identifying
the difficulty involved under Title VII:
The difficult issue in situations such as these is the determi-
nation of the level of business relevance necessary to justify
the utilization of a test. It is one thing to demand that a test
be designed to measure abilities relevant to job performance
and be an accurate determinant of those abilities, but quite
another to decide what showing is adequate to indicate that a
particular test is performing that function successfully. 10 7
While the court held the use of the tests invalid on the grounds
that they were not job related and produced a "de-facto racial
pattern of classification adversely affecting ... minority
groups,"' 0 8 it did not clearly enunciate the standard it used in
determining job relatedness. From the court's language, however,
it may be inferred that the standard was more stringent than that
used in Porter.10 9
A very strong statement in support of of job relatedness is
found in Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.110 Here the court
stated absolutely that use of tests must be shown to be a business
necessity in order to escape Title VII censure if the test results
substantially prefer Whites over Blacks. l The court not only
adopted the standard that the "skills measured by the tests must
103 Regarding the director's qualifications the court observed:
[H]e has been in the personnel department since 1951... one of the sub-
Jects in which he majored in college was psychology, .. he observed the
duties of the jobs' for purposes of test analysis, and ... he determined and
studied the performance on the job of employees who had been tested in light





105 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969).
10642 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 (1970).
107 306 F. Supp. at 1358- 59 (D. Mass. 1969).
10 8 Id. at 1358.
109 The court's specific holding was:
No validating norms have been established ... and the MBTA has made no
validating studies on its own in any attempt to check actual performance
against success on the test. At best the defendant has used the test on the
unsupported assumption that better test takers are also better drivers or
collectors.
Id. at 1359.
110319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970).
I" Id.at 319.
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be shown to be relevant to the employer's job performance
needs, 11 2 which is clearly consistent with the guidelines, but also
categorically stated that because of the great degree of uncertainty
involved in any decision as to which test is proper for the circum-
stances, coupled with the disparity in the quality of education
available to Blacks as compared with Whites and the basic as-
sumption underlying most tests that "persons have had relatively
equal exposure to educational materials," a careful professional
study regarding the use of the test is essential.113
As a result, the court held the testing program at issue unlawful
since the company had not made such a study and had adopted
the program solely upon the recommendations of its' personnel
department and since the experts who offered testimony at trial
had agreed that the tests had "no relevance to lower and middle
jobs in the plant."' 1 4 The court also ruled that the use of the tests
did not fall within the protection of Subsection 703(h) of Title VII
since the tests were at least " 'used to discriminate' because they
greatly prefer whites to Negroes without business necessity."' 15
The court further held that:
To interpret § 703(h) as protecting use of tests which are not
shown to be job related would be to drastically undercut the
overall legislative purpose of Title VII, which is to eliminate
all unjustified impediments to the realization of full equal
employment opportunity for Negroes. 16
By way of remedy, the court not only permanently enjoined the
use of the tests for Blacks, but also prohibited the institution of
any other testing program until its validity had been shown to the
court to have been arrived at using EEOC guidelines principles.
Although the Supreme Court in its decision in Griggs does not
in explicit language go as far as the Hicks court did regarding the
necessity of careful professional study, the Court did expressly
accept the guidelines position that tests must be job related in
order to be acceptable under Subsection 703(h).1" 7 The Court also
noted that the "administrative interpretation of the Act by the
112 Id.
113 Specifically, the court ruled:
Without such study, no employer can have any confidence in the reason-
ableness or validity of his tests; and he therefore cannot in good faith assert
that business necessity demands that these tests of unknown value be used.
Title VII does not permit an employer to engage in unsubstantiated specula-
tion at the expense of Negro workers.
Id.
1141d.
115 Id. at 320.
116 Id.at 321.
117401 U.S. at 433-36 (1971).
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enforcing agency is entitled to great deference."118 Furthermore,
the Court did include in a footnote 19 language from the guidelines
requiring "hard" data in demonstration of the correlation between
the tests used and the particular employment task. Therefore, in
weighing arguments as to whether the Court accepts the guide-
lines entirely or whether it leaves open the possibility of proving
job relatedness by a procedure unacceptable under the guidelines,
the former argument would seem to be the more weighty. 120
In summary, some courts recently have held that the use of
some ability tests may result in racial discrimination which is
prohibited under Title VII. In order to determine the job related-
ness of the ability tests in question, it appears that these courts
have largely adopted the stringent guidelines published by the
EEOC. Some have suggested that these decisions may eventually
lead employers to the complete abandonment of ability tests. 121
Regardless of such potential effects, it is clear that courts today
are taking a long hard look at the use of any ability tests to
determine job qualifications.
B. Seniority Systems
Seniority rules are the basis of another significant group of Title
VII cases. Seniority systems which are based solely on the num-
ber of years a given employee has performed a certain job serve
useful functions in today's business world 22 and would appear to
allow an employer to make decisions pertaining to job advance-
ment without reference to race. However, severe problems have
I" Id. at 433- 34,
119 Id. at 433 n.9.
120 One author has written:
One major consequence of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.... is to endow the
EEOC with the important function of issuing guidelines which, if within the
parameters marked by legislative intent, will be held to have the force of
congressional enactment.
121 See Blumrosen, supra note 75, at 388. Case Notes, supra note 7, at 193.
122 The seniority system ... continues to perform at least four important func-
tions. First, by eliminating the opportunity for discrimination, a seniority
system helps to counteract any antiunion bias that is not eliminated by
federal legislation. Secondly, the protection provided by a seniority system is
part of the quid pro quo for employee loyalty. Thirdly, although the turnover
of younger workers may be increased, a seniority system usually reduces the
overall rate of employee turnover, builds morale, and reduces the number of
grievances. Fourthly, a seniority system protects older workers from the job
instability and economic insecurity that accompanies rapid technological
change.
Kovarsky, Current Remedies for the Discriminatory Effects of Seniority Agreements, 24
VAND. L. REV. 683, 684 (1971).
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arisen with seniority systems which have been found to lock
Blacks into less desirable job positions imposed on them as a
result of past racial discrimination.
The difficulty arising with seniority rules relates to how lines of
progression should be merged when plants previously engaged in
formal racial segregation attempt to comply with Title VII. The
general pattern is that the best departments or jobs were reserved
to Whites. When formal segregation ceased, the separate White
and Black progression lines were usually merged, allowing Black
employees to transfer into the entry level jobs in formerly
"White-only" departments. Although as a result of the mergers
Blacks were in the same departments or lines of progression as
Whites, or were entitled to enter them, they often found them-
selves in positions inferior to those occupied by Whites having
fewer years of plant seniority.1 23
Title VII in Subsection 703(h) speaks to seniority systems in
the following manner:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to apply different standards of compensation, or different
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority or merit system ... provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate
because of race .... 124
The legislative history of this provision is quite sparse and con-
sists mainly of examples of what the Congress did not desire to be
a part of Title VII. When the Mansfield-Dirksen amendment (now
the seniority clause of Subsection 703(h)) was introduced, Senator
Humphrey, who had worked on the amendment, stated that it
served merely to clarify congressional intent and that the "provi-
sion makes clear that it is only discrimination on account of
race ... that is forbidden by the title." 125
The three foremost cases in this area, Quarles v. Phillip Morris,
Inc., 126 Local 189, Papermakers v. United States,127 and United
States v. H. K. Porter Co.,128 were decided on generally similar
factual situations. In these three 'cases, after racially segregated
lines of job progression were abandoned and the lines of
progression merged, Blacks found themselves lower in priority
123 Id. at695-98.
124 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
12 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964).
128 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
127 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
128 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
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classifications for promotion rights and job security than Whites
who had fewer years of plant seniority. This occurred since pro-
motion and job security were based upon departmental or job
seniority and in this regard only the time spent by Blacks in newly
available, previously White jobs was considered.
In Quarles and in Local 189, Papermakers, the courts held that
as to Black employees hired during the time of dual progression
lines, applications of the present systems were unlawful in that
they perpetuated the discriminatory effects of the companies'
prior discriminatory hiring policies and were without any justifica-
tion in business necessity. 129 The courts also held that in order for
a seniority system to be a bona fide one so as to be protected by
Subsection 703(h) of Title VIII, it must not without business
necessity carry forward the effects of prior discrimination. By way
of remedy, both courts adopted the "rightful place" doctrine
which in effect based the future awarding of jobs on plant, not
departmental, seniority. 130 Under this plan incumbent Whites
would not lose their current jobs to incumbent Blacks with more
plant seniority, but the result would decrease the promotional
advantage previously accorded incumbent Whites by virtue of
their departmental seniority. In response to an argument that this
was discrimination against the incumbent Whites, Judge Butzner
in Quarles stated:
The departmental seniority rights of white employ-
ees ... are not vested, indefeasible rights. They are ex-
pectancies derived from the collective bargaining agreements,
and are subject to modification. 131
In Porter, the court held the seniority system at issue did not
violate Title VII.132 However, the court stated it did not reject
Quarles or the district court's decision in Local 189, Paperma-
kers, but that Porter was distinguishable on its facts. 133 The
court's efforts at distinguishing these cases appears unsatisfactory,
though, since the major points of difference to which the court
referred 134 seem irrelevent to the core issue, i.e., whether or not
present reliance on departmental seniority from previously White
lines of progression constitutes unlawful racial discrimination.
129 279 F. Supp. at 5 IO-19 and 416 F.2d at 987-95.
130 279 F.2d at 520-21 and 416 F.2d at 988-92.
131 279 F. Supp. at 520.
132 296 F. Supp. at 56.
133 Id. at 63.
.134 These differences were that Blacks had the opportunity over six years to move up to
or to transfer to previously White jobs (although their plant seniority would then become
irrelevant and they would have the status of new workers for promotion purposes) and that
many Black workers failed to move into these positions. Id. at 63-64.
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Evidently the court justified its position on this issue by relying on
the prospective nature of Title VII. However, by dismissing the
issue in this manner, the court ignored the fact that the seniority
system's carry-forward without business necessity of the effects
of prior discrimination is in itself a present discrimination which is
remediable by Title VII. The Supreme Court's later decision in
Griggs in effect affirmed the position taken in Quarles and Local
189, Papermakers and rejected the position taken in Porter, since
it held Title VII applicable to discrimination resulting from the
use of facially neutral rules which carry forward the effects of
prior discrimination and which are not shown to be sheltered by
the business necessity justification.135
Apparent in Quarles and Local 189, Papermakers is the fact
that in order to evaluate effectively a seniority system which is
ostensibly neutral, its implications must be thoroughly examined,
and the availability of alternatives with a less devasting effect
must be considered. An essential part of this process is an in-
vestigation of the presence of underlying business necessity if it is
alleged by the employer. In both Quarles and Local 189, Pa-
permakers, the courts recognized that in certain departmental
seniority rules there is the basic and valid business justification
that employees must acquire certain skills and qualifications be-
fore progressing to certain other jobs. In order to honor this
necessity, the courts explicitly stated that the rightful place doc-
trine did not require that Black employees without adequate skills
or qualifications be moved to jobs which they could not properly
fill. 136 However, they were to be allowed to fill these jobs based
on their plant seniority if they already had sufficient qualifications
or when, after having been provided the opportunity, they had
acquired the requisite skills. In this manner, safety and efficiency
in running the business would not be jeopardized, and the right of
the Black workers not to be objects of racial discrimination would
also be protected.
In light of such precedent, the February, 1972, court of appeals
decision in United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.13 7 ap-
peared to be contrary to a developing trend. The requested rem-
edy, an order allowing reclassification of Black train porters as
brakemen without the loss of their accumulated seniority, was
denied under the business necessity doctrine. The court found
unquestionable prior discrimination13 8 but held that because of the
135 See notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra.
136 279 F. Supp. at 520-21 and 416 F.2d at 988.
1374 F.E.P. Cases 397 (8th Cir. 1972).
13s Until 1949 an agreement existed between the company and the union to employ
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differences in function and complexity between the two positions,
the seniority lines could not be merged as requested since it was
essential to safety and efficiency that experience be obtained at
the various levels of progression.' 3 9
In March, 1972, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
granted the United States' petition for rehearing en banc.140 Judge
Ross, who had dissented from the original decision, wrote the
majority opinion on rehearing en banc.' 41 He reasoned that since
the district courts have discretion to tailor remedies to obtain
compliance with Title VII, the needs of both sides could be met
by an application of the rightful place doctrine similar to its
application in Quarles and Local 189, Papermakers.42 The court
reversed and remanded and provided the district court with guide-
lines for fashioning a remedy.' 4 3
The guidelines as framed supported the fact that the majority of
the former porters had performed brakeman functions in addition
to their other duties as porters and therefore had experience.
They also reflected the fact that porters who had switched over to
brakemen, albeit without their seniority, had been given neither
special training nor student runs and had been allowed to begin
their braking duties immediately after they had passed a physical
examination. The company admitted that these men performed
satisfactorily. 14 This set of facts led the court to the conclusion
that a complete loss of seniority was not a business necessity.
C. Recruitment Practices
A leading author has argued that Subsection 703(a) of Title
Blacks only as porters; and as a result, no Blacks (with one possible exception) had been
hired as brakemen until 1966. Id. at 398.
139 The court held:
Not only is there a functional difference between the crafts of train porters
and brakemen, but Frisco's seniority system is based on a recognition that a
brakeman's job is complex and hazardous, requiring related experience in
safety and repair work at the various levels of job progression. Reclassifica-
tion with carry-over seniority, under these circumstances, could occur only at
the expense of safety and efficiency.
Id.
1404 F.E.P. Cases 528 (8th Cir. 1972).
1414 F.E.P. Cases 853 (8th Cir. 1972).
14 2 Id.at 859.
143 These guidelines stated inter alia that the company must offer brakeman jobs to all
the former porters; no other new brakemen were to be hired until all former porters had
been offered positions as brakemen; the company must implement a training program;
former porters successfully completing the training program may earn seniority credit for
100 percent of the time spent in training and retain 50 percent of their porter seniority. Id.
at 859-860.
4 Id. at 858.
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VII 14 5 imposes a duty of fair recruitment upon employers.1 46
Regarding the section defining equal employment opportunity in a
draft of Title VII, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare stated: "The bill defines equal employment opportunity in
broad terms to include a wide range of incidents and facilities, and
encompasses all aspects of discrimination because of
race .... "147 Since the definitional portion of Title VII is not
significantly different from the draft interpreted by the Committee,
the Committee interpretation can arguably be taken as substan-
tiating the proposition that there is a duty of fair recruitment. 148
The case law also supports this position. Courts have held that
some recruitment practices, though neutral on their face, had im-
permissible discriminatory effects and that these practices were
not justifiable on the grounds of business necessity. For example,
in United States v. IBEW Local 38,149 the union effectively
controlled allocation of available jobs through its hiring hall and
referral system. The union would fill jobs first with eligible jour-
neymen who were members of the local and then would refer
other persons. The district court had found that the two methods
of becoming a journeyman electrician, i.e., completion of the
union's apprenticeship program and passing the union's journey-
man examination, had been closed to Blacks. 150 Consequently,
Blacks were effectively barred from employment in the trade
regardless of their qualifications. The court found that in spite of
the fact that the union had formally relaxed its ban on Blacks, one
year prior to the filing of the complaint of 3,487 persons referred
out by the hiring hall only two were Black. 151 As of the filing of
the complaint, only two of 1,318 union members were Black, and
of 255 apprentices only three were Black. 5 2 It was also found
that the union contract covered 75 percent of all the electrical
145 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970). See note 26 supra.
146 See Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 472-76. Blumrosen supports his position using a
two-part analysis based on the language found in §§ 703(a)(1) and (a)(2), He first argues
that an employer wishing to perpetuate an all White work force might be tempted to use
recruitment methods which fail to give Blacks notice of available employment. According
to Blumrosen, it is this situation, not legislative redundancy, which prompted the inclusion
in § 703(a)(1) of the word "fail" as well as the word "refuse" in reference to hiring.
Secondly Blumrosen argues that when an employer uses recruitment practices which
perpetuate the employer's past discriminatory practices, he is in effect perpetuating segre-
gation by depriving Blacks of employment opportunities. Blumrosen argues such uses
should constitute "segregation" under § 703(a)(2).147 S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1964).
148 Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 473.
149 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
150428 F.2d at 146-48.




construction work done in Cleveland, Ohio. 153 In light of these
facts, the court of appeals held the union in violation of Title VII
because of the use of practices which perpetuated the effects of
prior racial discrimination. 154 In arriving at this decision the court
mentioned the fact that the district court had refused to order the
union to give notice to the Black community that it had ended its
recognized discriminatory practices 55 Apparently the appellate
court would have approved such an order as one form of
affirmative action to overcome the effects of the union's dis-
criminatory recruitment practices.
A nepotistic recruiting system was struck down as a Title VII
violation in Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler.156 The system
precluded Black membership in the union by restricting member-
ship to those who had obtained written recommendations from
three union members, had obtained the approval of a majority of
the union members, and also had four years improver or helper
experience. Even if a Black person could comply with the first
two requirements, he could not comply with the third, since
improver membership was restricted to sons of members or close
relatives who resided in a member's household. The court of
appeals affimed the district court's order which directed the union
to develop objective criteria for union membership. The court also
stated that while the nepotism requirement was at least partially
based on aims other than racial discrimination and although it was
applied evenhandedly to both Blacks and Whites, it was not
justified by any business necessity. Therefore, since the union was
all White, the nepotistic rule served to preclude permanently any
Black membership.1 57
A very strong statement regarding recruitment was made by the
district court in United States v. Ironworkers Local 86.158 In this
action the United States sought to enjoin several unions and
apprenticeship committees from engaging in racial discrimination
with reference to union membership requirements, work referral
opportunities, and apprenticeship training programs. The court,
after examining individually the activities of each defendant,
noted that where union membership was virtually all White, the




156 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'g 294 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. La. 1968).
15 7 Id. at 1054-55.
158 315 F. Supp. 1202 (1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.j, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971).
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rate information regarding job openings and membership require-
ments to Blacks.159 Furthermore, the court held that the defend-
ant must not only refrain from future discrimination but must also
undertake "whatever affirmative action may be necessary to as-
sure those discriminated against the full enjoyment of their right
to equal employment opportunities.- 160
Although all three of these cases generally support the fair
recruitment principle, Ironworkers Local 86 goes furthest in es-
tablishing fair recruitment as an affirmative duty under Title VII.
The approach in that case has gained recent support. In United
States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc.,161 the court imposed the
requirement that if a company has had all White jobs in the past,
"it is unlawful for it to limit notice of future opportunities in such
classifications to word-of-mouth recruitment.- 1 62 The court held
that Title VII also imposed a duty on the defendants to "under-
take affirmative action to vitiate effects of a discriminatory reputa-
tion in the Black community.' ' 63 The EEOC has also adopted the
view that there is an affirmative duty of fair recruitment under
Title VII.16 4
Fair job recruitment is a crucial first step in insuring racial
equality. As a result, the courts have demonstrated that apparent-
ly neutral recruitment practices which preserve past discrimi-
nation are subject to Title VII attack. Furthermore, the courts are
159 315 F. Supp. at 1235-36. The following conclusions of law found in the court's
opinion are instructive:
3. Where union membership is virtually all white, it is unlawful for a union
and its apprenticeship committee to limit information with regard to member-
ship, work referral opportunities, and apprenticeship training to union mem-
bers and other whites.
4. It is unlawful for a union and its apprenticeship committee to give false,
misleading or incomplete information to blacks because of their race, or to
fail or refuse to inform them of the procedures for application for member-
ship, referral or apprenticeship training.
6. It is unlawful for a union or apprenticeship committee actively to
attempt to recruit whites while making no effort to recruit blacks.
10. In proving a pattern or practice of racial discrimination, evidence of
the discriminatory reputation of a union and its joint apprenticeship program
is relevant and admissible. Such evidence is admissible to show how and why
blacks may have been discouraged from applying for membership, referral or
apprenticeship, and how and why some of those who did apply may have
been discouraged from pursuing their applications vigorously. It is also
admissible because it has a direct bearing on the nature and extent of the
appropriate relief to which the Government is entitled.
Id.160 Id. at 1236-37.
161338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
16 2 Id. at 558.
163 Id.at 559.
'64 EEOC Dec. No. 72-0703, 4 F.E.P. Cases 435, 437 (1971).
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beginning to indicate that recruitment practices which do not
promote a policy of affirmative recruitment to overcome past
discriminatory practices are not sufficient to withstand the sanc-
tions of Title VII.
IV. EMPLOYER RULES PRESERVING SOCIETAL RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
The preceding discussion has revolved around situations in
which, for the most part, facially neutral rules or practices have
been found to carry forward the effects of prior discrimination
engaged in by an employer or a union. The criteria to be discussed
in this section differ from those previously discussed in that their
use has been declared unlawful under Title VII absent any evi-
dence of prior discrimination by the particular employer. The
prior discrimination involved with these rules is chargeable to
society at large although this finding is not the paramount ratio-
nale upon which the use of these criteria has been declared
unlawful. Rather, the criteria, although neutral in form, are illegiti-
mate because they preserve or augment the effects of racial dis-
crimination.
A. Arrest Records
It has been noted that the use of arrest records by employers
may conflict with Title VII since the use of such records may
have a discriminatory impact on racial minorities. 165 An example
of this conflict is Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.166
In Gregory the company followed a policy of not hiring per-
sons, regardless of race, who had suffered arrest on "a number of
occasions."' 167 In order to effectuate this policy, once a job offer
was extended and accepted, but before the prospective employee
began his duties, he was required to provide the company with a
165 For an excellent review of how Title VII affects the use of arrest records see Note,
Arrest Records, Hiring Policies, and Racial Discrimination, 57 IOWA L. REV. 506 (197 I).
It is important to note how often arrest records are used:
A recent survey of employment agencies in the New York City area in-
dicated that approximately seventy-five percent of the sampled agencies do
not refer any applicant with a record of arrest, whether or not followed by
discharge, acquittal, or conviction.
Notes, Discrimination on the Basis of Arrest Records, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 470, 471
(1971). See also Steele, A Suggested Legislative Device for Dealing with Abuses of
Criminal Records, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 32, 39-42 (1972).
166 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970). For a discussion of this case see Note, 49 TEXAS
L. REV. 141 (1970).
167 316 F. Supp. at 402.
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list of all his arrests for other than minor traffic violations. In the
instant case, plaintiff, a Black person, was successful in the pre-
employment process until the company received his arrest list
which contained fourteen arrests, none of which had ended in
conviction and thirteen of which had occurred more than ten
years previously. The company then withdrew its employment
offer, and the plaintiff filed suit.
The court held that even though the company's policy appar-
ently had been administered fairly to both Blacks and Whites, it
was unlawful under Title VII. 168 The court based this finding on
the grounds that because Blacks, in proportion to their numbers,
are arrested significantly more frequently than Whites, a policy of
not hiring persons if they have been arrested once or more "dis-
criminates in fact" against Black applicants. 16 9 The court added
that the presence or absence of an arrest record without any
convictions was "irrelevant to ... suitability or qualification for
employment,"'' 70 that there was no evidence correlating this in-
formation with inefficiency or dishonesty in job performance, and
that there was no business necessity justification shown which
would override the discriminatory effects. As a remedy, the court
enjoined not only the company's obtaining this information from
the applicant, but also its seeking or attempting to obtain the
information from other sources. The court awarded plaintiff mon-
ey damages in the amount of the difference between the amount
he earned from the date of withdrawal of the offer and the amount
he would have earned during that period had he been hired.1
7 1
The EEOC has also followed this approach.' 72 It held there
was reasonable cause to find a Title VII violation where an
employer dismissed a Black employee who had failed to supply a
complete list of his arrests which had not ended in convictions.
Citing Gregory, the Commission stated that because of the dis-
proportionate number of Blacks arrested, Blacks comprise "a
vastly disproportionate percentage of persons dissuaded from
making application with respondent, because of the chilling effect
of respondent's arrest record inquiry."' 7 3 The Commission further
stated that since it was unlawful for the company to request arrest
record information, it was likewise unlawful for the company to
dismiss an employee for his failure to supply such information.'
74
168 Id. at 403.
169 Id.
170 id.
171 Id. at 404.
172 EEOC Dec. No. 71-2089, 4 F.E.P. Cases 148 (1971).
173 Id. at 149 (footnote omitted).
174 Id. at 149-50.
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In response to the employer's allegation that he also had other
reasons for dismissing the charging party, the Commission re-
plied:
It is now well settled that, where an employer has mixed
motives for discharging an employee, and any one of those
reasons is unlawful, the nondiscriminatory nature of the other
motives does not preclude a finding of reasonable cause to
believe that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employ-
ment practice within the meaning of Title VII of the Act.175
B. Garnishments
The recent Johnson case 176 struck down an employer's rule
providing for the termination of employment of persons who had
suffered several garnishments. 177 The Johnson court based its
opinion to a large degree on its reading of the Supreme Court's
holdings in Griggs.178 Although the conclusion reached in John-
son may be a desirable one, the court's reliance upon Griggs as
explicitly mandating this result is questionable.
The Johnson court stated that although Griggs dealt with a
factual situation in which the neutral criteria used by the company
had the effect of carrying forward the effects of pre-Title VII
discriminatory practices, this was not a controlling factor in the
Supreme Court's decision. 179 The evidence which the court used
in support of its conclusion is not persuasive. The court stated
that the prior discrimination referred to in Griggs was the inferior
education of Blacks and since this was the result of both present
as well as past discrimination in education, the distinction be-
tween past and present discrimination was rendered immaterial by
Griggs.i80 The basic fault with the court's argument is the fact
that the prior discrimination referred to in the Griggs decision
was that of the company, i.e., the fact that the jobs in question had
previously been open only to White employees pursuant to the
company's practice of preferring Whites over Blacks. The Court
cited the inferior educational opportunities available to Blacks
only as evidence of why the company's criteria had such a
differential impact on Blacks, not as the gravamen of the Title VII
violation found. The violation in Griggs was the use of ostensibly
175 Id. at 150 n.6.
176 Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D.Cal. 1971). See notes
66-68 and accompanying text supra.
177 332 F. Supp. at 494-97.
178 Id.at 493-97.
179 Id. at 494.
180 Id.
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neutral criteria which were not based on business necessity and
which had the consequence of continuing the company's prior
discriminatory policies by operating to " 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices."'181
The court in Johnson should have instead relied upon the
holding in Gregory which was based on implications which were
drawn from the Griggs decision and the purposes underlying Title
VII, rather than relying as it did on a literal application of the
Griggs opinion itself. The Johnson court could have fashioned a
stronger opinion by arguing that since a major purpose of Title
VII is to remedy racial discrimination in employment which is the
result of the use of criteria which are irrelevant to job perfor-
mance, the use of such criteria can no longer be tolerated. When
use of these irrelevant criteria has the actual consequence or the
foreseeable consequence 82 of denying Blacks equal employment
opportunities, use of these criteria as the basis of an employment
decision may be viewed as the functional equivalent of the use of
race as the basis of that decision. 183
It must be emphasized in dealing with this type of facially
neutral criteria that there is no need to demonstrate that the
employer has any intent to discriminate on a racial basis' 84 or has
in fact discriminated in the past. The crucial factor is that if there
is no business necessity for a practice which discriminates against
Blacks, there is no legitimate reason for allowing continued use of
the practice. 185
V. EFFECTS OF THE NEW LAW
The 1972 amendments to Title V11186 attempt to clear up
some of the interpretative problems which have hindered the
effectiveness of Title VII. The amendments also appear to codify
some of the interpretations of Title VII found in case law.' 8 7
The additions to Subsections 703(a)(2) and 703(c)(2) make it
unlawful under Title VII for employers and unions to discriminate
181 401 U.S. at 430 (1971).
182 The EEOC has recently used the foreseeable effects test in EEOC Dec. No.
72-0427, 4 F.E.P. Cases 304 (1971) (credit ratings and arrest records) and in EEOC Dec.
No. 72-0996, 4 F.E.P. Cases 480 (1972) (arrest records).
183 See notes 4 1-47 and accompanying text supra.
184 Indeed there is no necessity for this implication in dealing with any facially neutral
criterion. See notes 9- 26 and accompanying text supra.
185 Comment, Arrest Records as a Racially Discriminatory Employment Criterion:
Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 6 HARV. Civ. RICHTS-Civ. LiB. L. REV. 165, 178 (1970).186 See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
187 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, supra note I, §§ 2- 14.
[VOL. 6:97
Title VII Discrimination
against applicants for employment or for membership in a union
on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. 18 8 Con-
sequently, the Title has come several steps closer to a codification
of the duty of fair recruitment. Also, by way of incorporation of
the Vogler decision, 189 Congress apparently has adopted the posi-
tion that union membership requirements which carry forward the
present effects of past discrimination are unlawful.190
The conference report on the amended Subsection 706(g)
apparently affirms the results in Gregory and Johnson. The re-
port, in dealing with the scope of relief under that subsection,
states that it "also requires that persons aggrieved by the con-
sequences and effects" of unlawful discrimination be put to the
greatest possible degree in the position they would have had but
for the unlawful discrimination. 91 Since there is no mention that
effects here refer only to the present effects of past discrimination,
it is not unreasonable to assume that it is the congressional in-
tention to allow affirmative action to remedy all racially dis-
criminatory consequences not grounded in business necessity.
It is important to note that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 was passed after Griggs and after many other crucial
decisions had been handed down by the courts. The Congress
could have easily limited the developing doctrine by restricting
the terms of the statute. Instead of narrowing Title VII, however,
the Congress openly adopted the developing case law and tried to
make Title VII more amenable to the new doctrine. Thus, al-
though the new law does not greatly change the language of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, it has indeed altered the 1964 Act by
incorporating the expanding court doctrines.
VI. CONCLUSION
The interpretation given the "intentionally engaged in" lan-
1 88 1d. §8.
189 Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1967).
190 It is important to note however that Congress, by adding the language "or applicants
for employment" to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1970) merely attempted to clarify the
existing case law regarding fair recruitment practices. The language was not meant to
change the direction of Title VII. This notion is clearly expressed in the Sec-
tion-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, supra note 6, at H 1863:
These subsections [8(a) and 8(b)] would amend sections 703(a) and
703(c)(2) of the present statute to make it clear that discrimination against
applicants for employment and applicants for membership in labor organ-
izations is an unlawful employment practice. This subsection is merely de-
claratory of present law as contained in the decisions in Phillips v. Mar-
tin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); United States v. Sheet Metal
Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969): and Asbestos Workers,
Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
191 Id.
FALL 1972]
Journal of Law Reform
guage of Subsection 706(g) by the Supreme Court in Griggs and
by subsequent courts clearly indicates a finding of some subjec-
tive purpose to discriminate is not required. A practice that is
discriminatory cannot be saved from being struck down because
the employer or union demonstrated no intention to discriminate
or even instituted the practice in good faith. In making a finding of
discrimination, the essential factor for investigation is not the
employer's or union's motivation for choosing the criterion but
the resulting or foreseeable effects of the choice.
Title VII clearly extends remedies to practices which are overt-
ly discriminatory. However, it also apparently allows remedies for
practices which, though fair in form, are discriminatory in effect
when these practices are not justified by business necessity. The
majority of cases in this latter category has dealt with facially
neutral practices which carry forward the effects of prior dis-
criminatory practices. Recently, however, situations in which fa-
cially neutral criteria have been found to have racially dis-
criminatory effects and no basis in business necessity have been
held violative of Title VII without any showing of prior dis-
crimination. The interpretation of Subsection 706(g) as amended
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 gives support
to such holdings. To paraphrase the Supreme Court in Griggs, it
seems clear that Title VII will not tolerate practices (be they
neutral on their face, neutral in terms of underlying intent, or
neutral in their application) if the result of such practices is to
bring about either a consequence, an effect, or an impact upon the
protected class that will operate as "built-in headwinds" against
the congregsionally mandated goal of equal employment oppor-
tunity.
-Dianne Brou Fraser*
*Ms. Fraser is a third-year student at the University of Michigan Law School.
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